Trust has no place in Science
Trust has no place in Science.
Appeal to authority often masquerades as trust. This tweet byPaul Graham1 is an example.
If you think you don't trust scientists, you're mistaken. You trust scientists in a million different ways every time you step on a plane, or for that matter turn on your tap or open a can of beans. The fact that you're unaware of this doesn't mean it's not so.
Even the most celebrated Nobel laureate cannot just say, “Trust me.” A paper reviewed a jury of peers is the minimum requirement.
While there are fancy characterisations of Science (for example, Feynman’s “Science is the belief in the ignorance of experts”2), the core of the Scientific method is straight forward:
Formulate a testable hypothesis.
Look for counter examples to refute the hypothesis.
This is the most reliable way of accumulating empirical knowledge. Perhaps, even the only way.
Science is hard in part because looking for counter examples is not the default human disposition. Looking for examples is.3
People who are naturally disposed to look for counter examples are considered unpleasant. And Science is essentially professional grade nit picking. Can people with a strong need for social acceptance be comfortable with the scientific process?
The nit picking used to be hidden and people are used to seeing the finished product. Not anymore. Social media offer a new platform for scientific examination of popular topics (e.g. Covid19, climate change) as things evolve. Professional grade nit picking is out in the open: questions are asked, counter examples are paraded, etc. Therefore, it is understandable that such questioning is labelled as questioning the Science itself.
I love reading the essays of Paul Graham. Each one of them is well thought out and meticulously composed.
See here for a distillation of Feynman’s philosophy of Science. His Caltech commencement address delivered in 1974 is a must read too.
Indeed, confirmation bias is pervasive. Nickerson (1998) provides a comprehensive review of evidence and concludes that
In the aggregate, the evidence seems to me fairly compelling that people do not naturally adopt a falsifying strategy of hypothesis testing. Our natural tendency seems to be to look for evidence that is directly supportive of hypotheses we favor and even, in some instances, of those we are entertaining but about which are indifferent.